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Decentralization implies an increase in the number of stakeholders involved in the
design and implementation of interventions.  This paper draws upon the experience of a
multi-stakeholder program in India which has sought to increase the contribution of
rainfed agriculture to rural household's economic portfolios.  The strategy has been one of
enhancing government research and extension service provision through collaboration and
coalition building between NGOs and government line departments.  Evidence from the
last four years demonstrates that coalitions are appropriate vehicles for managing
interaction among multiple and diverse organizations.  However, as fluid entities without
permanent governance systems, coalitions require formalized support mechanisms to
function effectively.  The value to project designers and policy makers of this paper lies
primarily in the description and analysis of the "nested" organizational support system
which developed to fulfill the every day needs of the coalition in Rajasthan.  Its secondary
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In India, current moves towards decentralization and devolution in local governance
imply an increase in the number of stakeholders involved in decisions and control of
resources.  In agricultural research and extension these trends translate into the rhetoric of
demand-driven policies and programs.  However, practice often falls short of expectations,
particularly in rainfed farming locations.  Here, while poverty is commonplace and
agriculture constitutes a major part of households livelihood portfolios, agricultural
productivity remains low and cultural contexts militate against the farmers' voice being
heard by research and extension professionals.
This paper draws upon the evidence of a multi-stakeholder program which has
taken place in the predominantly rainfed areas of Rajasthan over the last four years.  The
principle objective of this intervention has been to increase the contribution of rainfed
agriculture to rural households' economic portfolios.  The strategy has been one of
enhancing government research and extension service provision through collaboration and
coalition building between NGOs and government line departments.  The program has2
brought together over 50 organizations.  These include state line departments, an
agricultural university, non-government organizations (NGOs), national and international
agencies and village level groups. Immediate gains in productivity were not anticipated
and this paper does not attempt to evaluate impact.  However, there have been measurable
and encouraging outputs.  Line department extension staff have been more successful in
meeting their existing targets in project villages; farmer groups are now active and are
making better use of government services; new composite varieties of maize are being
grown; existing irrigation facilities are functioning again under collective management; and
research is taking place under farmer conditions and with high levels of farmer
involvement.
Because of the number and diversity of actors involved in Rajasthan the intervention
was approached as a "process," rather than as a "project-driven," activity.  Disparities in
actors' perspectives coupled with limited experience of working together required this
process to be one centered on building coalitions of interest.  Evidence from the last four
years demonstrates that while such coalitions are fluid entities without permanent
governance systems they require formalized support mechanisms to function effectively. 
The value to project designers and policy makers of this paper lies primarily in the
description and analysis of the "nested" organizational support system which developed to
fulfill the every day needs of the coalition in Rajasthan.  Its secondary value lies in the
discussion of conceptual and practical aspects of building and supporting coalitions. 
The remainder of this paper begins by briefly introducing current shifts in the policy
and organizational context of the agricultural sector in India.  The partial success of these3
shifts is then used to justify the multi-stakeholder process-approach taken in the
intervention.  In section two the concept of coalitions is reviewed and their core functions
— information sharing, creation of common knowledge, shared decision making — 
examined.  This sets the theoretical stage for the description and analysis of the nested
monitoring, information and decision making (MID) system which evolved in support of
the Rajasthan coalition and which is described in section three.  The concluding section
summarizes the experience and draws out lessons for the design of multi-stakeholder
interventions.
POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
Current agricultural sector policy and program design in India demonstrate a recent
move away from traditional norms of agricultural research and extension to approaches
which seek to be more responsive to farmers conditions and requirements.  Evidence of
this shift in research is found in the GVK Rao Report (Gupta 1988) and commissioning of
the Johl Committee (ICAR 1996) both of which are concerned with potential
improvements in organization, procedures and structure as they affect research
organisations.  Acceptance of this refocusing at a policy level, has also been reflected in
the recommendations of workshops overseen by the Indian Council of Agricultural
Research (ICAR) in May and September 1995 (Katyal and Farrington 1997).
Similar trends are discernable in extension.  They are apparent in the new
interpretation of the Training & Visit (T&V) system of extension, which now places much4
more emphasis on: accessing a wide range of farmers for needs identification, problem
solving and technology testing; building organizational links between farmers and
government functionaries; allowing some decentralized decision making for financing
specific activities; and, improving the relationship between research and extension
(Rajasthan n.d.; World Bank 1992).
In operational terms, key policy shifts can be summarized as:
C recognition of an increase in the numbers and types of actors/organizations;
C a move from research station to farmers' fields as research sites; 
C use of social science perspectives and skills in supporting changes; and, 
C acceptance of the need for organizational and human capacity building.  
Despite this policy recognition of the need to consider the organizational and human
elements of technical change there is little evidence of its translation into practice.  Policy
initiatives, while providing a supportive context, have not yet managed to bring about the
full range of change necessary for the paradigm shift from scientist- to farmer-centered
agricultural development (Kerr 1996, 148).  For example, policy changes have had little
impact on the relationship between farmers and extension workers.  Poor farmers do not
feel empowered to make demands on an extension functionary in-spite of changes in the T
& V system.  Most are unaware that there has been a policy change.  In addition to there
being no incentive for extension functionaries to explain changes to farmers, it is
unreasonable to assume, especially in a hierarchical culture, that a low paid government
functionary will give up any opportunity he may have for rent seeking, investing in social5
Social capital is used here to indicate the stock of social relations in which people
1
invest and from which are expected to flow streams of future benefits.  The term is used as
Coleman (1990) defined it rather than the more recent interpretation by Putnam (1993).  
Putnam tends towards a definition of social capital in which social relations produce
desirable outcomes.  Coleman recognized the horizontal relationships identified by Putnam
but also included in his definition of social capital those hierarchical or vertical
relationships which can have undesirable effects for some groups or individuals.
capital,  developing other income sources or consolidating his position of power.  There is
1
no reason why he (and it generally is a "he") should.  The policy may change along with
some structural reforms in organization, but little attention is paid to those factors which
drive the system either from inside or from outside.  Internally there is little evidence of
changes in incentives or criteria and systems of accountability.  Additionally there is little,
if any, investment in enhancing the service providers' understanding of the need for
interaction and the skills needed to do it.  There is also little development of the client
groups' ability to make demands on services and functionaries or of systems which could
help them hold the service provider accountable for good performance.
The problems are similar but further compounded in research.  Relative to farmers,
especially poorer farmers, scientists occupy a high social position.  This positioning is
reinforced by an educational system which, in the wake of green revolution fervor,
continues to promote the hegemony of science, its products and a deductive, positivist
method of enquiry and analysis.  This is exacerbated by the lack of opportunity that a
farmer may have to either use or challenge a scientist's views or knowledge.  As with
extension, incentives for scientists to work with farmers are low.  The scientific
community is rewarded within traditional objectives, which predominantly focus on yield6
increases under controlled conditions.  Additionally, any mechanisms of accountability
which might ensure that existing platforms for scientist-farmer interaction (such as
diagnostic team visits) appear to be either non-existent or un-enforced.
CHANGES NEEDED
"We hear sudden declaration of fashionable support for participatory
approaches..(but)..under the cloud of cosmetic rhetoric, technocratic planning continues to
rule" (Cernea 1991, 14).
It is perhaps unfair to judge the effects of policy shifts when they are still in process. 
However, it can be argued that unless greater attention is paid to the factors which drive
the functioning of the organizations, institutions and human resources through which
changes are to be enacted, those implementing change will continue to use the paths and
behavioral patterns with which they are comfortable and for which they are equipped. 
These paths and patterns are rooted in professional, economic and social cultures and pose
a formidable challenge to those trying to change them (Chambers 1993; Moris 1991).  As
the limited success of the new T & V system (World Bank 1992) and ineffective efforts to
promote collegiate on-farm work demonstrate (Jiggins and Raman 1994), partial
modification of structures alone will not bring about behavioral change. 
While agricultural policies and programs have begun to address some organizational
factors they have inadequately considered those which would address issues of social7
Rules governing behavior.
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positioning, power and institutions,  and have therefore missed out on aspects of change
2
which could bring about paradigmatic and subsequent transformations on the ground. 
Current development discourse argues that, because of complexity and scale, these
changes cannot be managed solely through the imposition of external conditions
(Chambers et al. 1989; Howes and Chambers 1979; Reijntjes et al. 1992; Scoones and
Thompson 1993).  Hence, organizations involved in an intervention have to "buy in" or be
committed to any changes which may be required in their perspectives and ways of
operating.  Essentially, they need to become stakeholders on terms which are acceptable
and internalized.
Historically, projects and programs have adopted a different approach — one which
has reinforced a top-down, supply driven perspective to development.  This has largely
suited the working procedures of national bureaucracies and donor agencies.  However,
analysis of the often poor returns to, or impact of,  investments which take this approach
indicates that change needs to occur in a more evolutionary manner allowing both the
rationale for change to be understood and articulated by those whom it affects, and for
responses to change to be defined as events unfold.  Acceptance of this implies a shift in
both the management of change (from blue-print to process) and the apportioning of
resources (from primarily technical and physical towards more human and organizational
investment).
In contrast to traditional "blue-print" approaches, process approaches recognize that8
all projects have permeable boundaries and are influenced by their wider social and
institutional environment.  They take into account the unpredictable and idiosyncratic
elements in interventions (which are central to success or failure but have been rarely
considered explicitly by project management) and allow the freedom to define outputs and
activities.  This is the theory.  In practice "process" interventions are very hard to
implement and to manage.  They imply a level of decentralization which, if the process is
to be effective, depends on mutual understanding of priorities and purposes at all levels;
high quality of performance by all actors; and a significant degree of trust among those
involved.  On a small scale this may be manageable.  On a larger scale, such as that of
government programs or large donor projects, the organizational mechanisms which can
host the functions of decentralized process are rarely adequate.  As donors and
governments seek to cut back management and administration costs their ability to engage
professionally in program formulation and development is also seriously impaired.  This
restricts their understanding to an administrative level and reduces the organizational
learning of the funding agency.
Process approaches are potentially important but often require a higher degree of
devolution of fiscal and managerial power than is currently usual.  If decentralized, actor-
centered development is to take place several things need to occur: first, an "enabling
environment" has to be created through policy action and high level support; second,
restructuring of existing organizations will probably be necessary; third, investment in the
human capital which both staffs and is served by those organizations will need to be made;
and finally, organizational mechanisms to host decentralized and multi-stake-holder9
"Organization is essential to the achievement of effective agency...It is the
3
stabilizing and fixing factor in circuits of power" (Clegg 1989, 17).
interaction will need to be encouraged or created.
3
BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION
The events described in this paper are of the first stages of a process seeking to
enhance the performance of government agricultural research and extension services in the
State of Rajasthan.  Set against the changing background of agricultural policy in India the
intervention benefitted from past experience with attempts to change professional
agriculturalists' perspectives and behavior through "project" interventions.  The concept of
process was important in determining the approach of the donor (the Ford Foundation). 
In attempting to create a stakeholder owned and driven set of activities the funding pattern
attempted to be predominantly responsive (though on occasion pro-active) and
fragmented, not in terms of strategy, but in terms of timing and actors.  In this way the
boundaries and executive management normally associated with a "project" were more
difficult to apply — something which proved important when responsibility for impact was
questioned.
The intervention strategy focused primarily on the organizational and procedural
issues which have persistently undermined past efforts to improve the productivity of
farmers working in the predominantly rainfed environments of Rajasthan.  Its purpose was
to increase the functionality of  linkages between agricultural research and extension
services and their clients.  The development of debate and action involving government10
agencies and NGOs has been critical to both strengthening farmers' capacity to articulate
demand, and assisting government functionaries to respond.  In order to make this
collaboration effective particular attention has been paid to the channels and mechanisms
of interaction.
2.  CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
Many current policy and project efforts emphasize the role of NGOs as
development agents and encourage interaction between them and government departments
or agencies.  As in some other sectors, in agriculture NGOs are seen to play a useful link
role between the technical services and those farmers most poorly served by, and in the
worst position to make demands on, research and extension.  However, while supportive
of the enabling environment created by such policy initiatives, this intervention sought to
broaden the conventional interpretation of NGOs role and way they related to
government.
Acknowledgment of NGO's ability to reach disenfranchised groups and to work
effectively in a participative mode has increasingly led government agencies to "contract"
with NGOs to undertake rural development work (PRADAN 1996).  While this has
yielded tangible benefits for some rural inhabitants, serious questions of scale, efficiency,
technical capability and power can be raised about this form of relationship.  First, many
NGOs tend to be small organizations working in a restricted geographical area.  This
limits the spread of new ideas, approaches and improvements in productivity.  Second,11
there are many occasions when the development administration has staff in place
responsible for precisely those activities which NGOs are contracted to undertake. 
Certain conditions militate against sharp divisions of labor, but the scale at which the
duplication of manpower and services often occurs is inefficient.  Third, many NGOs do
not have the scientific or technical skills necessary for certain aspects of agricultural
development.  Finally, many NGOs are concerned that contract relations lead to a lack of
control over the design and implementation of procedures and activities.  Their staff
indicate a strong preference for collaborative arrangements which lead to cooperation and
collegiality with government staff but which do not threaten the autonomy of either party. 
This does not invalidate contractual working relations in specific situations, rather it
demands a paradigm shift from those issuing the contracts to allow early consultation and
negotiation over both the form of work and the decision of whether or not contracting out
is the best option.
Collegiality is not easy to establish among actors who often operate with very
different rules governing behavior and from very different organizational backgrounds
(Arya et al., forthcoming).  When the requirements of process approaches to development
are added, the problems of working together are exacerbated.  The demands of process
approaches on organizations and people staffing them are such that most are unable to
respond adequately.  Many, especially larger, NGOs and all government departments are
structured along hierarchical lines.  In such contexts the concept and practice of a
"learning organization" (Burgoyne 1992; Senge 1994) is very new.  Smaller NGOs may
demonstrate an ability to be more flexible and immediately responsive to changing12
Biggs and Smith (1995) argue that agricultural research coalitions are: (1)
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thematically based, i.e., they focus on a particular issue or interest; (2) have informal and
situations.  However, because of limited capacity, track record and legal status these are
seldom considered appropriate partners for government.  Where they are it has been
shown that their ability to respond to process requirements is usually frustrated by the
government's inability to operate in a similarly dynamic manner (PRADAN 1996).  It is
unrealistic to expect representatives of organizations struggling with new ideas,
approaches and responses to work together, to resolve differences in understanding, to
disregard issues of status and to operate as equal actors unless the intervention within
which they are working provides an environment supportive of consensus and "team"
building.
COALITIONS TO HOST INTERACTION
In Rajasthan the effectiveness of new working relationships largely depended on the
degree to which NGOs and government perceived themselves as a group sharing a
collective interest for at least part of their work.  This took the form of a collective
identity centered around improving the demand-response relations between government
agricultural services and poorer farmers.  This collective identity defined a broad coalition. 
It is argued that the idea of "coalitions" provides a useful construct for the management
and interaction of disparate stakeholders.
Coalitions refer to joint action by two or more interest groups against another
subgroup in an organizational context (Bacharach & Lawler 1982).   They provide a
413
often diverse membership; (3) have open boundaries, i.e., boundaries are not spatially or
socially circumscribed; (4) are time specific, i.e., they refer to the experiences of one point
in time; and (5) provide common ground for people/organizations whose involvement may
be motivated by very different reasons.  While agreeing in general with this
characterization, experience from Rajasthan demonstrates that coalitions may be spatially
defined and that time-specificity is not always a feature as coalitions do display an ability
to evolve in character over time and as the focus of collective interest shifts.
Interaction  is used here to refer to situations where the actions of one organization,
5
person or group is influenced by, dependent on, or oriented towards the actions of another 
(adapted from Farrington and Bebbington 1993, 127).
framework within which interaction occurs.   Interaction can take several forms which are
5
useful to describe in order to identify which are appropriate to a coalition.  Three forms,
adapted from the earlier work of Biggs (1990) are referenced: Consultative relations are
those where the views of some actors are solicited by others but not necessarily taken into
account by final decision makers.  The degree of formalization is usually controlled by one
party, which may choose to offer remuneration for the "services" of consultation. 
Contractual relations are formal and ones in which one party accepts to carry out
specified tasks, usually in exchange for financial remuneration, and with specified
performance criteria and time schedules.  In a contractual relationship, disputes can be
brought to a court of law.  The third form of relationship is collegiate.  As this form of
interaction requires that power equations between parties are equal or irrelevant it is the
only one appropriate within a coalition.  The collegiality can be acted out in number of
settings.  It may sometimes imply financial exchange, but more often than not is one where
actors trade information and ideas.
Coalitions differ as entities from organizations.  In addition to hosting different14
Rules can vary in their degree of formality, from written lore to shared
6
understanding.
They define the first as comprising: boundary and access rules; allocation rules;
7
input rules, penalty rules and conflict resolution rules. The second, taken from Tang
(1992) and Ostrom (1990) "give guidelines for formulating, changing and enforcing
operational rules (which) define who is eligible and how future rules will be made"
(Rasmussen op. cit., 14)  The third, constitutional rules, are those relating to how an
organization interfaces with groups, issues or entities beyond its collective boundaries.
forms of interaction a coalition represents an informal affiliation of individuals and/or
organizations.  It is neither subject to legally binding agreements which imply collective
responsibility nor does it have a permanent system of governance.  Coalition membership
may correspond to a formal organization but may also comprise sub-groups within and
across organizations.  Coalitions can also cut across the normative and more explicit
boundaries of everyday life, such as social grouping or political party.  This does not imply
that coalitions are not organized.  For effective interaction to occur there need to be
accepted forms of  interaction.
Coalitions are fluid forms of organization, but any form of organization implies
agreed modes of operation, or rules of engagement.  It is useful in this discussion to
distinguish between those rules of engagement which govern formal organizations and
those governing coalitions.   Rasmussen & Meinzen-Dick (1995) classify rules of
6
engagement for formal organizations as being of three types: operational rules; collective
choice rules; constitutional rules.   The first and last category are not a part of the
7
institutional framework of a coalition, and thus help define the differences between a
coalition and organization.  It is an adaptation of the second type — collective choice15
rules —  which helps the understanding, building and management of coalitions. Collective
choice rules are those which determine the boundaries of collective decision making and
action by defining and supporting forms and channels of interaction.  In a coalition they
are defined and refined by the collectivity who thus often feel greater identity than do
members of an organisation, for whom rules are often prescribed, with the norms which
determine their collective behaviour. 
A key rule of engagement for coalitions is that interaction must, even if it goes
through a conflictive stage, eventually arrive at consensus if collective decisions are to be
made, or joint action agreed upon.  Interaction at this point may represent "approximate
consensus," that is, where parties agree to differ on principles but agree on outputs. 
Another key rule is that within coalitions interaction should be collegial.
Because they have neither constitutional  nor operational rules coalitions cannot
engage in contract relations.  Contracts can occur between individuals or organizational
entities who affiliate themselves with a coalition but, because of lack of formalized
accountability, coalitions as a collective entity cannot enter into contracts.
ROLES OF COALITIONS
The anthropology of organizations has increased our understanding of competing
interests in the process of social and economic development.  From this body of thought
comes the "actor-oriented" approach of Long and Long (1992) which perceives
communities and development organizations as political actors pursuing different agendas
yet negotiating development outcomes.  This holds true for coalition members as does the16
Additional functions, which have often been at the center of analysis of coalitions in
8
the past, include advocacy and lobbying (Bates 1980; Gaiha 1993; Lipton 1989).  These
are beginning to emerge as important issues among coalition members in Rajasthan. 
However, as there is as yet only limited experience of these functions they do not center in
the discussion of what mechanisms are important to initially support a coalition they do
not form the focus of a particular section in this paper.  Rather they feature in the later
discussion on the performance of the coalition found in section 4. 
Longs' recognition that these entities may not be homogenous in their broader interests or
approaches.
Coalitions often bring together a wide range of interest groups — each making its
own decision on who to interact with and how.  Coalitions in Rajasthan were observed to
function at both an aggregated and disaggregated level.  The aggregate coalition was the
largest group of stakeholders involved in the effort to bring about agricultural change. 
Disaggregated coalitions were those which involved alignments of smaller numbers of
actors from within the former.  Choices of alignment depend on judgements of which
grouping best serves the member's purpose.
At the current stage of events in Rajasthan coalitions, both aggregate and
disaggregated, perform the following minimal functions  for members:
8
C information sharing
C creation of common knowledge
C shared decision making
While coalitions are characterized by structural fluidity, the services they perform for
members require regularized channels for information transmission and fora for debate and
decision making.  Without these "enabling mechanisms" the good intentions and space17
Given the extremities of inequality in India enabling mechanisms have to be robust
9
enough to withstand attempts of appropriation by stronger members of society who might
either see them as a means of increasing their power or as something which could
undermine their position of strength or status.
generated through policy change (referred to earlier as the creation of an "enabling
environment") is unlikely to be used to its full potential.
9
Each of the above functions has particular attributes.  These shape the form which
each mechanism takes.  Therefore, before describing the system which has evolved in
Rajasthan, it is useful to examine these more closely.
INFORMATION SHARING FOR MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS
Development implies change.  Effective decisions about change and the means of
achieving it, whether at an individual or societal level, are dependent on information being
available in a timely manner and appropriate form.  The smaller the universe in which
information is used, the easier are information systems to manage.  However, as rural
development programs become increasingly participatory the range of actors involved also
increases.  Along with this increase in scale come new demands on information systems. 
A set of activities in which there are several stakeholders requires a system or
complex of systems for both continuously handling information and using it for multiple,
diverse and different levels of decisions about action.  For example, a farmer involved in a
watershed development program needs a different set of information for farm management
decisions than does an external change agent, who may need fiscal, impact or management
data, or a Secretary to government who is making decisions about watershed development18
policy and programs.  All have equally valid information needs and make decisions which
exert a strong influence on each other in terms of activities, responses and relationships. 
Certain parts of each other's knowledge base can therefore be hypothesized as useful to
the other.
Information systems which service single individuals or groups of decision makers
can be fairly simple.  However, even in simple systems access to information is
conditioned by the physical, social and economic positioning of an actor.  In multiple
stakeholder situations, where different people have different needs and where circulation
of information depends on the contributions of a number of individuals and organizations,
the situation becomes more complex.  Information systems also often do not function fully
because of a lack of incentive to circulate information.  Therefore, if multiple actors are to
work together there is a need to ensure that (a) a common accessible information pool is
available, and (b) potential contributors value it enough to feed information.  The
Rajasthan case shows that vehicles to host flows and pools of information can be created. 
The experience also demonstrates though that unless there is enough pressure put on
members of a coalition to contribute by other members, some potential contributors can
become sitting partners and simply extract and use the information that others supply
without reciprocating.  Therefore, not only is there a need to put in place systems for
hosting information, there is a need to ensure that people both value what is available to
them and have the means whereby they are able to pressure members of a coalition
considered to be under-contributing.19
The concept of "raw material" is also contestable as, to become information, it
10
needs a vector and that vector screens the "material" through his or her socially
constructed epistemology.  However, for the purposes of this paper the issue is
approached pragmatically.  The concept of "raw material" is used to denote the first or
lowest level of extraction or interpretation. 
CREATION OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE
A further problem in designing systems which can assist in information sharing is
that even where information is circulated or available it does not necessarily mean that it
(the information or raw material ) will become knowledge (that is, information which has
10
been assimilated and re-expressed).  In addition, in a multiple actor situation it cannot be
assumed that circulating information will result in knowledge which is common to all
members of that group or coalition.  But common knowledge is critical for consensus
within a coalition and consensus, even approximate, is necessary for collective action. 
The belief that knowledge has to be common in multi-stakeholder situations is
rooted in the idea articulated by Foucault (1971) that knowledge is power.  For a coalition
(implying a high degree of equity among members) to function effectively each member
has to be equipped with the same knowledge of the subject being discussed or about
which decisions are being made.  This avoids the possibility of actors using knowledge in
either the behavioral sense (using knowledge to their own advantage at the cost of others)
or structural sense (to reinforce their position) (White 1993).  Either may undermine or
cause the breakdown of coalitions.
Scoones and Thompson suggest "While we cannot escape the strictures of our own
language...or our own ways of reasoning..., we can acknowledge that these provide us20
with only partial views of our world and that there is a multiplicity of other equally valid
ones" (Op. cit., 9).  In addition, however, diverse actors within a coalition have to accept
that each other's interpretation of phenomena is qualified by existing knowledge bases.
This can work positively as it implies that as a knowledge base is expanded the
explanation of phenomena, and subsequent response, may change.  For example, a farmer
may state that his/her maize crop has failed because of witchcraft — something which is
perceived as beyond his or her control.  A scientist may see that the crop has failed
because of either drought at tasseling time or pest attack and that the solution to either
may be under the control of the farmer.  If both the farmer's and scientist's points of view
can be explored and validated it is possible that in future the expanded knowledge base of
either party could lead to avoidance of future crop failure.
The building of common knowledge is therefore not without problems.  Not only do
bodies of knowledge differ but epistemologies also vary amongst diverse actors
(Bebbington 1992; Chambers 1992; Evans 1993; Harding 1996; Habermas, Lyotard, and
Rorty in Cahoone 1996; Scoones and Thompson 1993; Shiva 1988).  This is problematic
when trying to create common pools of knowledge.  There is little experience to guide
modes of operating under these conditions.  However, these situations exist and, as
decentralization gathers momentum, the number of situations in which multiple
stakeholders come together looks set to increase.
In practical terms, to exchange information and to use that exchange to create
shared knowledge requires development of mechanisms to host discourse and innovation.
As Scoones and Thompson note, "It is within a context of contestation that, through a21
process of dialogue and exchange, innovation and knowledge creation has and will always
operate" (op. cit., 10).  However, as pragmatists, coalition members will sometimes need
to accept ways of moving forward which may imply compromise, although not systematic
disregard, for certain group's knowledge.  A coalition must also ensure that those
mechanisms for creating common knowledge are as free as possible from appropriation or
misuse by particular parties.
DECISION MAKING FOR COMPLEMENTARY ACTION
Recent statements world-wide indicate that the state will seek to roll back its
boundaries and promote greater levels of common participation through group
representation.  However, the organizational mechanisms which enable information
transfer for creating shared knowledge which will lead to informed, collective decision
making tend to be ill-defined and often only partially functioning in many interventions.  In
decentralized and participatory development each actor is a stakeholder and by definition,
at some level, has the right to be a decision maker.  However, often stakeholders will be
from diverse institutional backgrounds; have dissimilar frames of reference; use disparate
vernacular vocabularies and knowledge bases; and aspire to different agendas.  The
creation of a system for sharing of information can help in creating a common knowledge
base for decision making, but creating a forum for equal participation in decision making
presents other problems.  In multi-stakeholder situations decisions are made by different
people and interest groups at different times.  Where government, NGO, farmers and
other interest groups all have strong stakes in a decision it is not too difficult to establish22
platforms for joint decision making.  Ensuring that issues of status and power do not
impinge on its functioning is another matter.  Where coalitions are to be established there
must be careful analysis of power relations among members and procedures put in place to
ensure equality.
Decisions concerning only one or a sub-set of all the stakeholders in a given process
present two further problems.  One is ensuring that the fora in which these decisions are
taken are open so that other members of the aggregate coalition can choose whether or
not they participate.  The other is the effect on pools of shared knowledge.  Any of the
interactions which occur between sub-sets of actors may give rise to new knowledge
which is common only to themselves.  Exclusivity of knowledge is not just a question of
power--although it can be important, it is also one of practicality.  The costs of dispensing
information can be high to the point of discouraging sharing. 
It is perhaps by focusing on outputs that solutions can be found.  Most decisions
result in some form of output.  This can be strategic, i.e., relating to policy or concepts, or
practical, i.e., relating to action.  The boundary for informing the common knowledge pool
could be when outputs relate to the common interest, or the process in which all
stakeholders are vested.  Similarly, decisions would have to be made by the sub-set of
actors about informing other stakeholders of the fora in which outputs were to be
discussed.  If others were seen to have or expressed a stake, then the fora should be open.  
Practical outputs include tangible action.  This action can be collective and involve
the entire group of stakeholders; bi-or tri-lateral, involving a sub-set of actors; or it can be
discrete and involve only one sub-set working on its own.  However, if that action furthers23
the interest of the whole, or aggregate, coalition then it and its effects are useful to the
collective knowledge.  Information about the action should therefore be fed into the
common information stream.  Effective feedback loops and beneficiary participation in
decision making can be found under the simpler conditions of two-party dialogue, time-
bound agendas and pre-determined objectives (Checkland 1989) such as in some
agricultural research projects (Pretty 1994).  The difficult but important task faced when
dealing with larger numbers of actors, is to apply similar principles to more complex
situations of information flow, use and decision making (Bawden 1992).  
3.  COALITIONS IN PRACTICE
The following section first describes events in the process of coalition building in
Rajasthan.  Next it outlines and illustrates a set of mechanisms that have evolved and
which are enabling the coalition to manage flows of information, create common
knowledge and support collective decision making.
EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES
The first moves in this program were made in 1992 when informal discussions were
held by the Ford Foundation Program Officer with senior government officials in the state
and districts; with NGO representatives from large and small organizations; and with
farmers.  There was consistency in defining the problem among these groups but much
diversity in opinions of  what to do about it.  While there was general agreement on the24
Few NGOs in Rajasthan had at this time focused on agricultural production.  Where
11
they had been involved in natural resource development both their technical and
organizational work had concentrated in environmental restoration and forest or wasteland
management.  The Ford Foundation initiative was timely inasfar as much of the physical
work completed as part of these earlier efforts had created the preconditions for
improving agricultural output.  
need for participatory development, debate on the potential of collaboration between
NGOs and government indicated very different perceptions of possible working
relationships, particularly regarding decision making power, accountability and fiscal
responsibility.  Despite these differences of perception over the form that new working
relations might take, government and NGO staff expressed interest in further interaction
and met formally to discuss strategic options at a state level meeting in May 1993
supported by the government but organized and funded by the donor. 
During the first year of discussion three grants had been made by the Ford
Foundation to NGOs of different sizes and with different capabilities who were willing to
attempt bringing farmers and government staff closer together in villages.  Initially these
actions were not so important for what they achieved physically, but because they served
to focus the debate on the practical matters of what to work on and how to work
together.  They also gave NGOs who did not need or want donor support the opportunity
to observe and discuss the opportunities and cost-effectiveness of involvement in the
agricultural sector.   All this was documented informally by the donor through circulated
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letters and notes which reported and commented on visits, discussions and issues.
Initially, there was no prescribed structure or pattern of activities.  While there was
agreement on the primary goals and objectives, there were no "project" boundaries, no25
script and no limits on who participated.  Three factors determined this.  First, it was
considered essential that stakeholders themselves developed and defined the activities and
relationships which they thought appropriate.  Second, a more structured or pre-
determined approach would have needed more informed actors.  Collaboration in the
agricultural sector had been extremely limited.  Thus there was no experience on which to
call in formulating new action.  Third, the Ford Foundation could not finance exploratory
planning processes or field experimentation on a large enough scale or, in the final stages
of project definition, was in the business of negotiating structural change within
government.   It was anticipated that the emerging evidence of clients efforts to interface
with government services would provide both evidence of the need for structural change
and offer ideas of how this could be done.
The donor organized a further formal State level meeting in February 1994.  NGOs
and government reported on the collaborative activities in which they had been involved
over the past months and the Ford Foundation Program Officer put forward a working
strategy paper.  This paper was intended as a thought piece and did not represent an
attempt to offer actors a "blue-print," but a framework on which to hang the different
activities which were beginning to take shape.  It was anticipated that this meeting would
serve as a point of consolidation and the strategy paper would offer a rationale and
structure for the various activities.  Additionally, it was expected that the meeting would
help participants recognize a collective purpose and sow the seeds of a future coalition.
The program has included efforts to both expand perceptions of the various parties
of how to work together and to ensure that collaboration has not become reduced solely26
to contracting.  The strategy pursued sought to develop balanced working relationships
which drew on NGOs' participatory and organizational skills and built on the government's
technical capabilities, geographic coverage and funds — without setting up organizational
boundaries which would undermine collegiate interaction.   In addition to government and
local NGOs there were strategic inputs and support from external agencies, particularly
for training and initiating process monitoring.  The donor role in this has been mainly a
facilitator of  process rather than a monitor or administrator.  As with all exploratory
work, the development of experimental action was to be part of the process and while
hypotheses about outcomes could be made, they could be proved wrong or modified.
Over the two years following the initial state level meeting the donor made a series
of grants for both direct field action and process support.  Four additional grants were
made to local NGOs to work collaboratively with government extension staff in villages
on agricultural and related natural resources development.  Funding was made available to
an NGO managed Krishi Vigyan Kendra (KVK) to establish a local information exchange
unit.  A client-driven research fund (managed by the KVK) was established.   Additional
background research was financed separately focusing on: user groups; research-extension
linkages; women's role in Rajasthani agriculture; and NGO-government experiences and
options for collaboration.  A farmer-based extension media needs survey was also
undertaken.  At the request of a Deputy Director of Extension an international
organization (the International Institute for Environment and Development, United
Kingdom) was brought in for recurrent participatory planning training and follow-up for27
farmers, NGO staff and government functionaries.  This team was also to document how
the existing research and extension system dealt with the demands and needs of farmers
which emerged from the seasonal participatory planning exercises.  They were then to
make recommendations for structural changes necessary if the system was to become
more client driven.  Partial funding of an international meeting on farmer participatory
extension enabled representatives of both government and NGOs involved in the work in
Rajasthan to participate.
In addition to the increase in donor financed action a number of other actors
engaged in the process without external funding.  Five non-grantee NGOs are currently
working or involved in discussions with extension services.  There has been a program of
exchange visits to government's, NGOs' and a bi-laterally financed project's field sites. 
NGOs are now permanent invitees to the Zonal Research and Extension Advisory
Committee meetings which are held seasonally to determine research and extension
strategies.   At the state level the Government of Rajasthan has broadened their definition
of the role NGOs can play in the participatory development component of the World Bank
funded Agricultural Development Project.  It has also helped establish an organization
(ARAVALI) to act in a liaison and coordinating capacity for government and NGO
interaction, and has embarked on a major effort to decentralize agricultural research and
extension services in an attempt to make them more cost-effective and responsive to the
needs of resource poor farmers.  GoR has also used resource people from the exercise to
help in the formulation of proposals for 'Community involvement, farmers' participation28
and NGOs', in the agriculture sector chapter of the IXth Five Year Plan.
MECHANISMS TO HOST COALITIONS
The narrative description of  events in Rajasthan anchors earlier conceptual
discussion but does not explain the processes or the mechanisms which have developed to
support those processes.  These factors, which both host and drive change, are often given
insufficient attention in project design and analysis.  However, they were critical in a
situation involving multiple stakeholders who were entering a new mode of operating and
new ways of relating to each other.  The mechanisms which exist now in Rajasthan are
ones which have developed alongside growing field action and state level interaction.  It is
assumed that they will continue to evolve as both the actors and the context in which they
work change. 
The need to focus on interactive mechanisms in Rajasthan was apparent from the
early days of the initiative.  It was clear both during the second state level meeting (1994)
and in smaller meetings that had taken place over the preceding year that while oral
information relating to the organizational, procedural and behavioral problems of working
together might be shared informally, formal presentations and reports on activities
repeatedly skirted these critical issues.  Several reasons, which needed addressing if
collective action was to succeed, underlay this:
C Direct individual and public reporting can personalize issues and jeopardize
relations;
C These were not issues or topics which the actors were used to considering or29
felt would change as a result of articulation in public; and
C No locally controlled or institutionalized mechanisms for inter-organizational
information exchange, debate or decision making existed. 
It was apparent that collective activities would not be effectively undertaken,
understood or modified without channels for monitoring, information exchange and
decision making.  If issues of process were not shared and understood mistakes would be
repeated, lessons lost and dissatisfaction would rise to dysfunctional levels.  Information
flow and its use needed  to be enhanced.  Without this, shared knowledge would be
uneven, understanding of events and opportunities disparate and the likelihood of
achieving the degree of consensus necessary for collective action very limited.  As
collegiate collaboration, particularly in agricultural development, was unfamiliar to all
actors, on-line learning and response was considered to be as crucial during the formative
stages of work and negotiation as when activities began to take shape and occur.  Process
monitoring (PM) was therefore initially identified as a key informational aid as those
involved in the initiative sought to first understand what was happening and why, and then
use this knowledge to take informed decisions about changes. 
By the time of the second state level meeting, and after a fruitless search for a
national agency which was both available and had the capacity to undertake PM activities,
an international agency (the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), United Kingdom) was
brought on line by the donor.  ODI was to both assist local organizations develop PM
systems and to undertake monitoring of inter institutional interaction as the process of
improving agricultural extension and research service provision developed.  30
While there was early awareness of the need for both inter and intra organizational
process monitoring (PM) the manner of operation and the way that this activity would be
linked to the other coalition service functions (creating shared knowledge and enabling
collective decision making) were not initially clear to the donor, the actors in Rajasthan or
the organization undertaking process monitoring.  The mechanisms through which this PM
information was to be used by the emerging coalition were thus not prescribed at the
outset of the program, but emerged and were supported by the donor — either practically
or strategically — as the actors and context evolved.
In the following section the multi-purpose and multi-level information and decision
making system which has emerged in Rajasthan is described and conceptualized.
A NESTED SYSTEM
 Gathering information as events occur, undertaking rapid analysis of that and using
the new knowledge to inform future action falls within the domain of what is commonly
described as process monitoring.  While definitions of this term abound (see in particular
Korten in Veneracion 1989) it is useful here to define both that term and its sister
activities.  Process monitoring (PM), strictly speaking, is a set of activities designed to
collect longitudinal information on a dynamic set of actions.  PM focuses on not only
inputs and outputs, but also on what drives a process.  It examines human, social and
organizational dimensions of events, as well as the outcomes, as part of an analysis which
seeks to understand causal factors and effects.  Process documentation is the act and art
of recording that information.  Process analysis uses this documentation to enhance31
understanding of why events and actors are taking certain courses.  The next stage is to
translate that new knowledge into informed action.  In this paper PM encompasses all
three of the above.  It is an activity particularly suited to multi-stakeholder situations
where continuity of interaction and learning demand regular review of relationships
between actors, the institutional and organizational mechanisms which govern
relationships, and, the outcomes (decisions, activities, debates, disagreements) of
interactions.
If PM is to function effectively either within or between organizations there must be
linkages between the PM system, its users and decision making, or conferral, fora.  What
has evolved in Rajasthan is described as a "nested"  system.  This is one comprising
multiple discrete but selectively linked information sets.  In such a system each actor
maintains an independent information system which is useful in informing the activities in
which they engage.  In addition, actors also open channels for inputting and accessing
information to and from a common system.  They can be lobbied to provide certain
information, but not be forced to conform.  However, effective users have to be
contributors in some form and need to state their claim, that is they buy in or out, at
regular intervals and accept responsibility for that claim.  To become an effective tool in
the use of knowledge, a nested system needs to be supported by nodal agents (“nodes”)
— for PM information synthesis and management, and joint platforms ( “niches”) — for
debate and decision making.
In the rest of this section a monitoring, information flow and decision making













from Rajasthan.  The nested MID system comprises four components: independent
monitoring systems; information management nodes; decision making or discussion niches;
and dependent linkages.  These are schematically outlined in Figure 1, and described
below.
Figure 1  Schematic representation of a nested system33
A system is defined as a set of elements, the linkages between which are stronger
12
than linkages with other elements. 
Independent Systems
At the heart of a nested system are functioning independent monitoring systems. 
An independent "system" may vary in its degree of formality but will always consist of
flows of information between individuals or groups who share a common interest in an
activity, information or decision.  Independent monitoring systems become more useful to
a coalition when they are part of a shared system of monitoring, information flow and
decision making (MID).  Those sharing a common interest might be groups of farmers —
who may have a relatively informal system of monitoring and information exchange; an
NGO and a group of  farmers--who may have a more formalized system of meetings and
record keeping; or a government extension system — which depend principally on a
formalized system of reporting and information exchange.
The independent system is the lowest level discrete system  which can be identified. 
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It will be recognized as an entity by participants and will often be dependent on stocks of
social capital.  Each independent system may use information for different purposes and
makes decisions in different fora.  There will be probable variance in ability and willingness
to collect, analyze, record and make available information.  However, if organizations are
to be contributors to and users of a nested MID system they have to satisfy their
responsibilities to the shared system.  This may involve formalizing their information
management systems and the form in which they contribute to the common information
pool.34
As distinct from process monitoring systems.
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Conferral is used in this paper to describe debate or decision making.
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A number of independent monitoring  systems exist among the actors involved in
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the Rajasthan initiative.  Each varies in its purpose and performance.  They are, to varying
degrees, currently in operation for: the government extension services; the agricultural
research agency (a campus of the state agricultural university); non-government
organizations; funding agents; and an international agency (ODI).  Each uses its own
monitoring system for its own purposes.  Until recently, much information exchange or
conferral  between independent systems (other than that of ODI) tended to be informal
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and ad hoc.  Organizational size, organizational ethos and costs of monitoring appear to
be key to the diversity observed in different systems.  Thus efforts to link and/or modify
these into a "nested" system concerned with process demand a deeper understanding of
the mechanisms used in existing systems and their operational rationale.
Examination of the various organizations in Udaipur suggests a continuum between
"open" and "restricted" MID systems.  Open systems are typically those in which
information is informally managed and accessed.  Restricted systems display the opposite
characteristics.  It is apparent that, while MID systems service different organizations in
different ways, along the spectrum independent MID systems perform three principle
functions: they feed back into action; they inform about performance;  and they constitute
the basis for strategizing by executive interests.  Prior to the recent collaborative initiative,
small NGOs were typically found to be located towards the "open" and government35
agencies towards the "restricted" end of the MID spectrum.  For internal purposes small
NGOs tended towards informal, ad hoc monitoring systems which depended mainly on
oral information transmission.  Their small size often allowed for democratic decision
making and the processes and fora were informal.  Links to external information systems
tended to rely on individual contact and interest, and centralized knowledge systems were
rarely initiated or accessed.  In contrast, monitoring in the Department of Agriculture's
extension service was highly structured, institutionalized in pre-determined formats, and
dependent primarily on written records such as diaries, records of demonstrations, inputs
supplied and fortnightly meeting attendance by farmers.  Internal information access and
flows are formal both between the service and its clients and within the Department. 
Examples include, fortnightly meetings between a Village Supervisor and a farmers' group;
monthly meetings of Village Supervisors with Agricultural Extension Supervisors;
meetings with Subject Matter Specialists; seasonal visits by diagnostic teams of "experts"
to assess research and extension needs; and seasonal Zonal Research Extension Advisory
Committee meetings.  Decision making is highly centralized and mainly undertaken by
administrators and managers rather than practitioners.  Between the two extremes
illustrated here fall NGOs of different sizes and government offices working under special
schemes or projects.  
Monitoring systems in Rajasthan have until recently concerned themselves only with
matters important within the organization, with the singular exception of reporting to the
paymasters.  This latter type of monitoring tended to be formalized and dependent on
documentation for all groups principally because of the similar interests of their "external36
clients."  Donors' and senior bureaucrats' needs centered mainly on financial, managerial
and primary impact information.  Differences in monitoring systems for external purposes
were therefore small among organizations at different points along the spectrum.
When ODI joined the intervention in Rajasthan it was confronted with a task which
initially few actors were able to understand or appreciate as a non-judgmental and
constructive part of the process they had embarked upon.  Many of the participants were
unclear as to the purpose of process, as opposed to conventional project, monitoring.  The
donor and ODI agreed on broad objectives.  PM information would:
C ensure multi-stakeholder learning which would lead to more effective
collaborative activity,
C enhance individual organizations' capacity to assimilate knowledge and inform
action,
C assist in the institutionalization of learning organizations capable of evolution,
and
C monitor the donor’s own operational efficiency. 
While several participating organizations already had monitoring systems in place it
was rare for these to focus on process, particularly the human or institutional dimensions. 
Most were concerned with outputs and products rather than how and why particular
points or achievements were reached.  Additionally, in Rajasthan it was rare to find a
system which used information for decentralized or on-line, rather than end-of-
project/phase, decision making.  Where this did occur systems were usually very informal;
only useful in small organizations; and produced information which was not robust enough37
to withstand external scrutiny.  The only system for inter-organization exchange which did
exist was ad hoc in the extreme, prone to information distortion, and not usable for
collective decision making.
More recently however several NGOs have begun to approach monitoring in a
different way.  They have been experimenting with PM and linking outputs to new or
modified channels of information flow and new forms of decision making.  This has
changed not only the purposes of information handling but also how they do it and what
kind of information then is available to clients.  To give some specific examples: one large
NGO uses PM in a very focused way to primarily record and understand the effects of
project intervention.  While the information this system deals in parallels more traditional
monitoring systems which focus on inputs and outputs, it differs in the use it is put to and
in the people that use it.  This organization was one where interpretation of PM as a
conventional survey activity initially led to data overload in both collection and analysis. 
Since that initial learning period the collection of information has become far more
focused.  One example of this is tracking the adoption of composite maize varieties over
several years.  This represents an attempt to understand the processes of information
transfer, particularly between farmers.  In terms of how it is used and by whom, the
information is gathered by project field workers and has been used by them, at a
decentralized level, to make decisions on the most effective mode of information
transmission.  This understanding, along with several other factors, led the NGO to
develop a cadre of community elected agricultural para-extension workers who interface
closely with the government extension functionaries for technical referral and training. 38
Used within organizations PM can therefore assist in the evolution of "a new type of
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organization.  It will be able to deal with the problems and opportunities of today, and
invest in its capacity to embrace tomorrow, because its members are continually focused
on enhancing and expanding their collective awareness and capabilities.  You can
create....an organization which can learn" (Senge 1994, 1).
PM is thus becoming an integral part of the management, information and decision-making
(MID) system of that organization.
Another large NGO has taken a much more holistic approach to PM and has
dedicated a special team to understand the processes by which development does or does
not occur.  This information is fed back to all within the organization at regular monthly
meetings during which the observations are discussed and decisions taken or tabled for
future consideration.  The organization refers to this effort as one which seeks to establish
a joint management and information sharing system.  Transition and change generally
result in some conflict and there has been tension between field staff and those engaged in
PM with the inevitable accusations of "policing" and other misinterpretations occurring. 
However, the organization's management and those involved in PM have been largely
successful in changing the perception of the purpose of information gathering and the uses
to which it is put.  There are signs that this experience has influenced the way that the
organization communicates internally and reaches decisions, making it now an
organization more concerned with internal learning and decentralized decision making
than previously.
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Other NGOs have used PM and linked it into MID systems in different ways.  In
brief two smaller, but operationally very different, NGOs have used PM in a case study39
In many smaller organizations process information is transmitted orally.  Because of
16
this term process monitoring documentation is avoided.
mode to understand the factors underlying changes in farmer's behavior in order to
improve the design of their own interaction.  Another large NGO has also used PM to
understand scientific research processes and effects of collaborative efforts with farmer
participatory adaptive research and testing on farmer's fields.
Each system varies in both the degree of formality with which information
(oral/written;  loose/highly structured) is handled and the decision making processes it
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informs.  The tools and techniques of information handling are as varied as the actors, but
the use of conventional social science methodology is rare.  No trained sociologist or
anthropologist has worked specifically on PM with the organizations concerned.  None of
these systems attempts to arrive at an "objective reality," or to apply analytical techniques
with academic rigor, but seeks to understand from within and to use that information to
make adjustments to their everyday work.  This feature, while functional within
organizations which it can be assumed have a high degree of shared culture and
vocabulary, poses interesting issues of interpretation when information becomes a public
good.
Dependent Linkages
This is highlighted in the second feature, or set of features, of the MID system —
the dependent linkages between independent systems.  The nested system will comprise
similar but more formalized features than an independent system.  It is argued that this40
Organizational capital defined as structures and procedures (stocks) which host and
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enhance the functioning of collective action (flows).
formalization, or investment in organizational capital,  is a pre-requisite to sustainable,
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multi-stakeholder processes and that investment needs to be continuous as the greatest
value organizational capital continually responds to exogenous and endogenous change or
pressure (Burgoyne 1992; Alsop and Rosser 1994).
In the nested system the dependent linkages are of two types — informational
(passive) and conferral(active).  A passive link is one that is undemanding of those it
touches, and active link is one implying reaction or involvement.  It is important in terms
of this model to distinguish these information linkages from service linkages, which
although carrying information are the subject of PM rather than the vehicle for PM.
Both information and conferral linkages can be characterized in terms of their
(i) direction; this can be one or two way dependency; in Figure 1 the arrows
depict where information is drawn from or who confers;
(ii) temporal character; this is of three types --
(a) continuous, conducting a regular and recurrent flow 
(b) periodic, conducting intermittent flows
(c) conditional, dependent on particular events or issues to provoke a flow 
(iii) the type of information; this again is of three types --
(a) managerial, concerning fiscal, procedural and applied activity 
(b) organizational, concerning inter stakeholder relationships 
(c) material, concerning inputs and outputs.  This covers both actual or41
concrete inputs/outputs and options such as new activities, projects,
programs or funds.
One or more of the above characteristics may be manifested at any time.  Each may
also change type or combination as a result of external factors or internal transformations
in an institution, organization or group.  The degree of strength of dependent linkages in
Rajasthan reflects the early stage of the nested system there.  Linkages are beginning to
establish themselves, unevenly but surely.  To illustrate:
C Current information flows between NGOs and farmers in villages which can
be typified as two way, continuous and both managerial and material.  The
extent to which they can be described as conferral links varies according to
the operating style of the NGO.  Some organizations are hierarchical, a
characteristic which militates against participation in decision making, others
demonstrate a flatter, joint decision making structure.
C There is a continuous information link which deals mainly in material
information and includes that from government extension staff to NGO staff
and farmers.  At present the return flow is limited, and continuous conferral
links are nascent.
C Recent periodic information and conferral flows include those emerging from
participatory agricultural planning exercises involving government extension
staff, farmers and NGO staff.  The type of information is mainly managerial
and material and currently the quantity of return conferral is reduced as it42
progresses up the hierarchy of government.  This is frustrating for field level
actors and highlights one of the problems of trying to operate in a
decentralized manner when the referral and decision making structures which
implementors have to interface with are insufficiently process oriented.
C Managerial and material information have flowed in a mainly one way
direction regarding a new government supported extension project and its
financing options.  The conflict between hierarchical structures and conferral
linkages has again been apparent as opportunities for return flows of
information, particularly those of an organizational nature, have been
extremely limited.
C The inter organizational PM outputs now constitute a two way, periodic
information link concerning mainly organizational issues but having some
material content.  ODI's relationship with other stakeholders is rarely of a
conferral nature, as its role is not primarily concerned with decision making.
In Rajasthan the most prominent multi-organizational linkages have been a quarterly
publication (Recent Developments) and bi-monthly meetings (the GO-NGO-Research
Forum — "the Forum").  There have also been numerous informal exchanges of
information and working papers produced on specific issues emerging from this
collaborative experience.  Recent Developments, to which contributions are made by
individuals and organizations,  has served as the key vehicle for information about
collective interests and experiences.  The Forum has been used as a mechanism for
information exchange, discourse and collective decision making.43
Using the temporal characterization introduced earlier, information flowing through
these dependent linkages has been dependent on the timing of publications or meetings (an
example of a periodic flow) although there is also evidence that the organizations involved
are beginning to use these channels more strategically and to respond to specific events or
opportunities (an example of a conditional flow) — such as a non-functional interaction
between government and NGOs, or visits by  senior bureaucrats.  The most active
supporters of these dependent linkages have been the NGOs — although a small number
of government staff have also demonstrated a commitment to sharing information and
debate.  The relative inactivity of government staff is partly attributable to apathy but also
to shortcomings in the public sector's routine procedures for information sharing.  It is
also probable that NGOs perceive greater benefits from MID systems of an inter-
organizational nature than do the government.  In a situation such as the one found in this
intervention, where the financial support from the donor to national organization has been
minimal for PM, it is apparent that any group, organization or individual will only invest in
activities which have benefits perceived as outweighing the costs.  Costs include finance,
confrontation, workload and loss of power.
Nodes of Information Management
The third formalized feature of a nested PM system is a node of information
management, i.e., a point or agent used as a gatekeeper to filter, analyze, document and
circulate information.  This can be a rolling responsibility or a task assigned to specific44
This is further articulated, with some differences in modeling, for early PM activities
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in Rajasthan in Gilbert and Khandelwal (1995) in which they note that " Changes may be
qualitative or quantitative" (ibid, p. 4) and identify the following criteria for assessment as
1.  Assessments of Impacts on Organizational Linkages and Performance: (i) the
manner of interactions between GOs and NGOs; (ii) nature of collaboration; (iii) the
performances of collaborating institutions; and (iv) attitudes.  Qualitative indicators
include: (i) procedures and modalities of planning and implementation of agricultural
activities; (ii) adjustments in research themes; (iii) adjustments in the manner of
interactions with village groups; (iv) changes in research themes and technical messages in
response to feedback; and (v) improvements in reporting, monitoring  and accountability
in relation to services provided to rural communities.  Quantitative indicators of
performance changes may include: (i) area coverage; (ii) frequency of contact with
farmers; (iii) resources available for development efforts; (iv) number, size and scope of
collaborative agreements; (v) frequency of contacts between organizations; uses of these
additional resources; (vi) frequency of interactions/contacts with other organizations (GOs
or NGOs); (vii) extent of information flows (within and between organizations)...... 2. 
Impacts in Livelihoods in Rural Communities: (I) impacts in the form of improvements
in productivity and livelihoods, (ii) Changes in tie degree of dependence in other sources
of  income, migration and non-farm activities. (ibid, adapted from page 5)
actors.  It is a difficult role, as much mechanistic as visionary.  In mechanistic terms, the
nodal agent needs to be able to design and manage a system for accessing and sharing
information on both a regular and intermittent basis from independent systems.  An uneven
information set, which can arise from the failure of independent systems to contribute, can
be problematic and can affect the use which coalition members can make of the output. 
In terms of visionary roles the agent also needs to know what information is needed
especially when the need arises from new or unforseen events.  This implies, in addition to
regular information gathering, a continuous and often informal search of sources to assess
what information needs to be collected and what new actors are emerging.  The search
should also identify and discard redundant information and its collection.  
A PM nodal agent in a multi-stakeholder situation needs to collect information on:
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(i) the dynamics and changes of inter-agency and group relations, i.e., how they
work together; in what areas; the power balance and contribution to the
relationship.  The last would cover physical and service inputs.
(ii) the effect of the process on both the clients and the service providers. This
encompasses physical and service outputs; changes in behavior and attitudes--
including farm management practices; and organizational responses.
This function has proved critical in ensuring that there has been inter-organizational
information sharing — of a managerial, institutional and material nature.  The amount of
time it takes to provide this service to the 50-plus organizations involved in the work in
Rajasthan is such that it does require a dedicated service provider.  As noted earlier in this
paper, initially an external agency (ODI) was asked to serve the collective interest and
perform this role.  A local agency was brought on line about a year after activities began. 
This organization currently assumes the responsibility  as an information node with
minimal help from ODI.
The system now in operation is functional but suffers from certain factors which
impede tight synthesis, analysis of information and presentation of results.  The publication
of Recent Developments remains relatively trouble-free as the local agency explicitly
minimizes editorial powers and re-prints contributions in a form as close to the original as
space and language allow.  Working Papers, which require identification of issues and
analytical writing are more problematic. These problems include shortage of specialized
skills, but also acute awareness of the differential sensitivities of the multiple actors to
interpretations of the information being contributed or collected.  These problems were46
relatively minor during the time ODI played a nodal function.  ODI was financed to
undertake this work; it had many of the requisite skills for synthesis and analysis; and very
importantly, as a short -term and external actor, local sensitivities did not affect its
behavior as much as they might in the case of a local agency.  This problem would have
arisen primarily during the time when the purpose and performance of PM was being first
introduced, but also has shown signs of affecting the local agency as it assumes this role
later into the process.  There has been at least one incidence of  suppression of possibly
contentious information by those "managing" information.
Niches
The fourth critical feature of a nested PM system are the niches, or platforms, for
multi-stakeholder reviews and decision making.  Within a nested system there may be one
or more niches.  These can be multi-level, but need to retain a capacity to evolve. 
However, at all stages they must be recognized by the majority of stakeholders as
legitimate entities, even if they do not regularly attend.
Niches represent a particular place, or point in time, where specific matters arising
from PM or other information sources can be tabled and discussed.  They are the place for
inter-stakeholder debate on line issues and for putting forward new proposals or ideas.  As
such they represent the resting place of conferral linkages.  While participation in niches
will vary with events and agendas, it is debatable whether niches should be open to all
stakeholders.  In principle the transparency which comes with open access is desirable. 47
However, the resultant debate can be cumbersome as multiple agendas clash and
vernacular language inhibits understanding.  A pragmatic response is that records of niche
events (meetings) are made publicly available and that response channels, or conferral
linkages, are open to all.
Several niches currently operate in Rajasthan.  Each has a slightly different function
and  is therefore favored by different groups of stakeholders.  These include: regular
meetings in villages of NGO staff and farmers; increasing occurrences of village and block
level meetings of government extension staff, NGO staff and farmers; the Extension
Department's own set of regular closed meetings; twice yearly research and extension
planning meeting managed by government staff, to which NGOs are now invited; a
quarterly district level  meeting of NGO and government staff (the Forum); at the state
level there is a relatively inactive State Level Advisory Committee, but more
encouragingly an organization (ARAVALI) has emerged whose specific business is to
assist NGO-GO interaction.
In Udaipur, the Forum is the most obvious example of a collective decision making
niche and the most apparent manifestation of an aggregate coalition.  Its early life was
typified more as an arena for information exchange and discussion than for decision
making.  It was initially a gathering where broad organizational groups presented their
work and stated their position.  While the research establishment has, with some
exceptions, generally not moved beyond this, the extension department and NGOs have
begun to make more creative use of this platform.  There are examples of creativity  which48
For example, the request by coalition members that the convener should write to the
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heads of department in the Rajasthan Agricultural University to urge stronger participation
in the Forum.
include the discussion of contracts for extension under the World Bank supported ADP
and the formation of a working group to discuss future strategies for interaction.  
Information is shared in the Forum and subsequent discussion moves this towards
"common knowledge."
Evidence suggests that the Forum is beginning to be used to reach decisions on
allocation of money and to determine the future of GO-NGO interaction.  A Working
Group also emerged from a district wide workshop — which was attended by the most
senior sector bureaucrats in the state.  This group has recently presented its
recommendations about the collaborative initiative which the Forum ratified.
Interestingly, however, while shared decision making for strategic action takes
place,  there are very few examples of where practical action has emerged as a direct
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product of the Forum.  In practice the Forum provides a platform on which members can
present their own positions and meet others having similarly, or complementary, interests. 
From this actors identify partners with whom they feel inclined to work.  Discussions
however on the specifics of this action take place bilaterally or as disaggregated coalitions,
not within the Forum itself.  The Forum thus also plays the role of broker.
A further useful role of the Forum is that positions have been publicly defined to the
point  that it is apparent that some forms of potential interaction do not at present warrant
continued discussion.  An example is interaction with the mainstream formal research49
establishment.  While individual scientists may demonstrate interest in collaboration and
on-farm work, the organizations within which they work do not encourage or support this. 
Changing the mainstream research environment is not a cost effective task for the Forum.
While proving to be critical in increasing the feeling of collective interest among the
various actors, niches have suffered from certain constraints.  In addition to those
associated with challenging normative modes of interaction with "senior" people, decision
making niches have also had to contend with people arriving unprepared or not briefed for
discussion despite circulation of documentation beforehand.  Both sets of problems are in
part culturally rooted but have to be confronted if collective interests are to be openly
debated.  Many multi-stakeholder meetings have ended either inconclusively or with a
dominant party making a decision  on everyone's behalf.  Behavioral norms represent
enormous difficulties for a single chair-person, especially one who is part of the same
culture.  A short term solution has been on occasion to use an external person to chair
meetings, but alternative approaches which place the responsibility on the collective are
more useful.  In Udaipur these are gradually evolving and include agreeing on: agendas at
the beginning of meetings; which items will be taken to conclusion; time limits for voicing
opinions and for coverage of a particular topic, and implementation of "secret" voting
procedures.50
4.  DISCUSSION: COALITIONS AND MID SUPPORT SYSTEMS
The trend of government decentralization and higher levels of popular participation
in governance and development leads to expectations of increasing demands for
collaboration, joint learning and decision making by diverse groups of actors.  This
increasing inter-dependence paradoxically comes at a time when individualistic behavior
has become overtly recognized, accepted and often encouraged.  These conditions demand
new or remodeled systems and investments in the social and organizational capital which
drive and maintain the systems.  This paper reports on events in progress in one specific
location.  Frustratingly, but pragmatically, it is thus difficult to draw more than qualified
conclusions.
The introduction to this paper stated that this initiative did not expect to generate
immediate productivity gains and the paper itself did not attempt to evaluate impact. 
There have though been measurable outputs.  These include improvements in line
department staff village level performance, increased activity of farmer groups, better use
of existing government programs, adoption of new maize varieties,  on-farm research and
re-activation of irrigation facilities.  Further benefits include the impact of experience on
the design of state agricultural policy and programs. 
In Udaipur the coalition continues to develop and at present is involved in a
decentralized planning process for a new intervention in the agricultural sector supported
by a bilateral donor.  This new project will take place in three additional districts.  In one
there is a history of collaboration and a project office upon which a less organized51
This complexity is a function of the number of organizations involved, their
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familiarity with each other, the existence of channels of communication and fora for
discussion and the emergence of power-plays.
coalition of NGOs and government departments center their interests.  In the two other
districts there has been no history of regular, or even particularly effective, GO-NGO
collaboration.  There is a marked difference in the manner in which organizations in these
three districts have set about their planning exercise in comparison to those in Udaipur
District.  In the latter, although the process has been complex , it has been much more
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streamlined.  Existing "nests, nodes and niches" have all been used fully to exchange,
debate and make decisions on activities and plans.  The needs of decentralization are thus
better met where organizational mechanisms supportive of collective action exist.  While
initial transaction costs have been high the benefits are now being demonstrated through
more efficient action.
The remainder of the paper summarizes and examines further some of the important
and outstanding issues if these concepts and structures are to develop in Rajasthan or to
be used in other situations.
COALITIONS FOR PROCESS INTERVENTIONS
In Udaipur the coalition does appear to host the three functions of information
sharing, creation of common knowledge and collective decision making.  It could not have
done this if the mechanisms, or four components of the nested MID system described
above, were not functional.  The collective interest and the usefulness of the support52
mechanisms become more explicit over time and as have actors become increasingly
familiar with each other.
Genesis, Dynamics and Support
Coalitions, because of past experiences, have not until recently enjoyed common
currency or support in Udaipur.  The level of cynicism about collective action among
organizations has been high and there have been frequent questions over the cost-
effectiveness of  the people coming together and attempting to collaborate.  Despite this,
the collective interest continues and far from such challenges being considered problematic
it is suggested that this ability is an important aspect of a coalition.  Because of its nature
and forms of interaction a coalition is open to constant questioning of purpose.  This
enables it to respond and evolve in ways that a formal organization would not be able to
do.  Ownership of a coalition is unspecified (so in this respect no-one loses "position"
from change); all parties are decision makers (each, rather than a manager, has a right to
articulate their opinion); information and knowledge, as they relate to the shared interest,
are common (no-one's individual knowledge base is challenged); and it is structurally fluid.
Coalitions, as unstructured and loosely governed ways of organizing people, offer
useful guidelines for policy makers or project designers concerned with multi-actor
practice or intervention.  However, the genesis and dynamic of coalition building are
critical.  Interventions cannot be designed to included coalitions as organizational elements
in multi-stakeholder contexts unless participants in that potential coalition agree that they
are an appropriate and valid form of organization.  The implications of decentralization are53
thus that not only should stakeholders be party to decision making during implementation,
they also need to be party to the design of interventions or programs and to openly debate
the various forms of their organization and interaction. Greater stakeholder power in
design is a costly and time consuming business and is not one which sits easily with the
current trend of reducing preparation costs or manpower inputs.  Neither is it an easy
activity to introduce to those such as government line department staff who have never
been encouraged to be conceptually creative in their own work or to take responsibility
for designing future action.  Decentralized planning is a challenge that program designers
need to have patience with and assist potential stakeholders initially in doing.
One of the positive aspects of the Udaipur coalition was that no-one, or no
particular organization, assumed ownership.  Yet initial stimulation and continued support
originated from one source.  In Rajasthan the various actors initially came together at the
behest of a donor.  It was also the donor who provided funds for those who assumed
responsibility for each of the functions.  However, apart from a lone voice of
disagreement, neither the aggregate coalition nor any of the satellite/two-party spin-offs
are regarded as donor owned or driven.  While the Ford Foundation may have increased
the profile,  provided added impetus and helped create organizational and human
resources to assist increased interaction, all it was doing was giving life to existing
government rhetoric.  It therefore appears that while an external party may promote and
support a coalition, a coalition is an entity that is dependent for survival on internal
validation.  Program designers must therefore allow time for iteration between the
development of human capital, the expression of collective interests and the evolution of54
support mechanisms.  They must also provide financial and professional support  for the
needs of collective action (such as training or organizational cost coverage) as they
emerge.
The questions of initial stimulus and continued external support both relate to scale. 
Where the partners in coalitions are few, the issues thematically and geographically
focused, and the costs of arriving at a common knowledge base and joint decisions low,
then coalitions might be expected to initiate, sustain and change themselves.   Larger-scale
interaction among organizations or interest groups is likely to be more demanding of a
wide range of resources (including finance, skills and consistent and strong but not
dominant, leadership), and so more difficult to initiate and support.  Alternatives, in terms
of self-support via coalition partners' own contributions, to external financing appear very
few, at least in the context of low-resource agriculture.
Post planning implementation of process development demands that all actors are
equipped to respond to on-line information.  This is unfamiliar territory for many line
department officials and to a degree for some NGOs.  It is also as difficult for donors as it
is for many others involved in process programs.  Operationally it begs a change in the
way that both policy makers and those responsible for everyday management in donor and
government organizations have traditionally behaved.  A different set of skills and
communication processes are called upon.  The donor (and this includes senior
government officials) is not simply a source of  funds or directives, it has to become a
partner in debate and decision.  In place of being an administrator, it needs to become a55
facilitator of interaction and vision development.
In addition, planners need to recognize that funding cannot be simple and uniform. 
Process approaches require opportunistic, responsive and multi-purpose financing.  For
example, grants made by the Ford Foundation in this Rajasthan initiative have supported
one or several of the following components: collaborative field action, studies, meetings
(State, District and international), process-monitoring, short and long-term training and
follow-up, organizational development, and documentation.  Organizations supported
chose what they wanted funds for and retained their autonomy at the same time as
recognizing the interest they shared over some issues with other groups.
Another difference in the demands of process projects relate to the importance of
ensuring that senior policy makers and bureaucrats are not only informed of events, but
also participate in debate and decision making.  It is also critical to bring district level staff
into the same processes.  To do this fora and information flows, independent of their
traditional roles and free from the laws of hierarchy, need to be established and made
equally accessible to all.  A donor, free from the obligations of local and national social
capital, can transgress traditional boundaries and gain access to actors of all social and
bureaucratic strata.  In Rajasthan this ability has proved important in initially opening
channels between levels of government hierarchy as well as between government and non-
government agents.  While it has not be possible to completely shake off the bonds of
tradition, there are signs that investment in appropriate organizations and mechanisms —
especially those such as process monitoring outputs and joint fora which de-personalize
relations and enable collective recognition and responsibility — are an efficient way of56
channeling changing human capital.
If donors, be they external agencies or national governments, are to accept process
development and to accept that they are members of a multi-organizational coalition, they
thus need to reform their management of change and how they allocate finance.  Currently
both donor and government procedures are usually driven by expenditure targets that have
to be met within financial years.  These have to become considerably more flexible if they
are to meet process requirements.  Increased support for process interventions also
requires an enhanced capability among donors to understand how processes are evolving,
and to make adjustments to the specifications or levels/flows of finance attached to
funding agreements.  Process monitoring is one activity which can assist understanding. 
Another, suggested above, is deeper involvement by the staff in the activity being
financed.  Both requirements run counter to current pressures to reduce the size of
administrations relative to each action financed.
Additional Functions: Advocacy and Lobbying
There are two further roles that coalitions can play in addition to providing the
vehicle to explore and build upon complementarities of organizations and performing the
three functions of information sharing, knowledge creation and collective decision making. 
They are those of advocacy and lobbying.  Coalition members have to decide whether or
not they can withstand the stresses which lobbying and advocacy may entail.  To bring
about change in favor of the rural poor — those most disadvantaged by the economic and
social environment in which they live — the existing hierarchies and systems upon which57
This evidence runs through development literature as well as through examples of
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labor and union movements.  The 'critical mass' argument is one that justifies developing
interest groups, in particular in our case, farmers' groups.
they depend often have to be challenged.  For coalitions interested in poverty alleviation a
major decision at some point is going to be what strategy they pursue, and to what extent
the tactic they employ will be confrontational.  Designers of interventions will need to
assess possibilities of confrontation and devise mechanisms which allow discussion and
defusion of contentious and potentially disruptive issues.  At a project level such
mechanisms can include regular opportunities to "unfreeze" project purposes, outputs and
activities.  Debate at this point may lead to re-focusing or restructuring.  It may also lead
to defusion of an issue by simply giving it public space for airing and discussion.
Coalitions, or organized groupings of individuals, offer the opportunity to confront
power by giving agency to previously powerless actors or groups of actors.  Evidence
from elsewhere demonstrates that it is necessary to create critical masses if previously
disenfranchised groups are to enter into a situation of negotiation as legitimate and
empowered actors.    In Rajasthan, coalitions are largely formed by cross-organizational
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groups interested in improving rainfed agriculture and in identifying and negotiating their
respective roles.  Within the aggregate coalition three broad groups can be identified-- the
research establishment; the extension professionals, and the NGOs.  Bringing together
those broad groups has been important for empowering each in their negotiations with
another broad group.  Examples of this include NGOs' tacit agreement to live with their
differences and to openly debate, as a single interest group, the opportunities for58
interacting with the Department of Agriculture and the research establishment.  The
support of NGOs also assisted the extension department to publicly challenge the research
establishment over the appropriateness of their research method and outputs.  Where the
aggregate interest is strong enough a coalition provides a useful unit for exchange of
views of sub-groups.  Where the aggregate interest is fragile coalitions, having no formal
agreements to bind them together during a period of internal dispute, will fragment.  In
terms of managing change, or a specific intervention, designers thus need to ensure that
there is a back-up or trouble-shooting mechanism in place.  This can take the form of a
professional support organization mandated to only become active during times of dispute
or when arbitration is needed.
Another function of the aggregate coalition in Rajasthan has been the presentation
of a unified front to parties.  Examples of this have included a meeting with a Director of
Agriculture during which his suggestions for contracting NGOs (on government terms and
for conventional T & V activities) were unanimously rejected as unacceptable by NGOs. 
While research and extension staff assumed a neutral position in the debate, their mere
presence during discussion added passive weight to the coalition's position.  Other
examples of collective identity include presentations made to the Secretary of Agriculture,
variously through letters, during workshops/meetings and through process monitoring
outputs. 
One of the most striking examples of the shift in negotiating power created by
Recent Developments was in a conflictive mode.  In January 1996 a number of smaller59
NGOs were invited to Jaipur at short notice to discuss with senior Department of
Agriculture staff their proposals for agricultural extension activities under the ADP. 
Government staff were poorly prepared for the meeting, which ended inconclusively.  A
representative of one of the NGOs subsequently wrote an open letter in Recent
Developments to complain of this poor treatment.  This, in turn, prompted a rapid
response from the Secretary for Agriculture.  There can be little doubt that this one
example of the way in which a PM vehicle gained a better hearing at State level for the
complaints of an NGO that might normally have difficulty in asserting itself even at
District level greatly enhanced the regard in which Recent Developments was held. 
However, this letter would not have been prepared without external support to an
organization unfamiliar with expressing itself at an appropriate level.
While this mutual support and cohesion has demonstrated the coalition's
effectiveness there have also been examples of in-fighting and fragmentation.  Cohesion
will always tend to break down if the issue in hand either concerns smaller groups or
collective interests are satisfied.  Groups demonstrate a tendency to divide internally as
soon as external challenges are withdrawn.  Coalitions can only be useful when members
are operating in circumstances where their collective interest is stronger than their
individual differences.  When the collective need is met or the balance between collective
and individual differences shifts towards the latter the coalition will break down. 
Designers of interventions have often failed to recognize this tendency of group behavior
and thus design formal organizations which often become redundant.  This can be because60
the organizations in question have fulfilled their mission and are incapable of evolution, or
because a more fluid and temporary entity such as a coalition may have been a more
suitable unit for issue-based collective action.   Formal organizations may not be
appropriate mechanisms for managing collective action.  Coalitions may be, but if they are
to be used their limitations and transience needs to be factored in.
  It is a complex balance.  The examples above of unified articulation  demonstrate
the beginnings of effective advocacy and lobbying.  It would have been impossible at their
earlier stages for the coalitions which have emerged to align themselves in this way.  They
were too diffuse and had developed no collective agenda or concern over particular issues. 
While the gathering of collective forces has been shown to be effective -- events and issues
arising out of them are now almost guaranteed the attention of senior bureaucrats — there
is a question of how far a coalition can pursue lobbying routes before destructive internal
tensions are created or before its pressures on another party cause a negative reaction
detrimental to interaction.  In contradistinction to this it is also likely that unless the
aggregate coalition does bring about change — something which is more likely to occur
when the group is in advocacy or lobbying mode — many participants will lose interest.
NESTED MID SYSTEMS
Coalitions have been suggested in this paper as a useful way of framing and
organizing for collective action.  The point has been made however that these entities need
to have formalized mechanisms in place if they are to function and to overcome internal
tensions.  Any process model, never more than a representation of a vision or idea,61
constantly shifts in response to new knowledge.  This is particularly true of the nested
MID system which has been presented in this paper as one set of coalition support
mechanisms.
Two continuing tensions currently dominate the decisions of individual
organizations on how far to engage in information sharing: one is the cost of analyzing
what may currently be largely informal information flows, the other is mistrust about how
information may be managed.  In relation to the first, for those (especially smaller NGOs)
relying largely on informal flows, the costs could be substantial and have to be weighed
against the anticipated benefits of "signing up," which are difficult to determine, especially
in the early stages.  The benefits are partly assessed on the basis of what tangible financial
support is available for the system.
The second tension concerns both the dissemination and use of information.  For
example, whilst a policy decision may be taken at State level to make certain subsidies
available, this may be prevented from filtering down by rent-seeking behavior among mid-
/lower level functionaries.  Widely held suspicion among NGOs that key information is
being withheld from the public domain in this way will discourage their participation in the
information system as will any hint that information relating to specific organizations or
individuals, made available through a common system, will be used for policing rather than
constructive learning.  This implies the need for an "interim agent" or impartial liaison
functionary to be built in to MID systems at a state level.
MID systems may constantly mutate.  One example from Rajasthan is the
development of satellite systems around independent systems: some NGOs have begun to62
exchange information among themselves and there is some indication that communication
between government departments is increasing at a district level.  In terms of Figure 1 this
would be shown by the overlapping the spheres which symbolize independent systems.  It
is not yet clear if these new relationships will continue to be typified by informality and
fluidity and if they will continue to consist mainly of information rather than conferral
flows.  Systems thus have to be able to change and evolve as the situation in which they
are functioning changes and the purposes they serve develop.  The design lesson here is
that systems, rather like the interventions they may be part of need to have opportunities
to revisit and re-orientate their mandate and function.
SUMMARY
It is easiest to summarize the lessons of this experiment involving organization of
collective action in a series of observations emerging from the experience in Rajasthan. 
C In situations which are unfamiliar to actors enabling environments, that is
supportive policy environments, will not generate change unless enabling
mechanisms are also established.  
C For these situations a multi-stakeholder intervention requires a process, not
pre-determined, approach.  
C A process approach will demand changes in both the pattern of financing and
the form of professional support given by the group initiating the intervention. 
 C Financial and support patterns need to shift towards higher levels of early
investment in human and organizational capital development.  This implies63
greater initial transaction costs but more sustainable and effective long term
impact.
C Multi-stakeholder development requires coalition building.  Coalitions, while
displaying characteristics better suited to multi-agency action than formal
organizations, are often fragile and transitory entities.  They thus require the
assistance of an external agent for troubleshooting and liaison.
C Coalitions will need investment in formalized monitoring, information
exchange and decision making mechanisms.  The implication of this is that
one or more organizations has to take on these support roles.
C Coalitions cannot contract with organizations and thus need a formal
administrative body able to do this.  This leads to the conclusion that in multi-
stakeholder action coalitions may assume a management or executive function
but that they need a formal administrative body for every-day maintenance.64
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